The meaning of commemoration is to draw necessary lessons and to prevent mistakes from happening again. The lessons from World War II — we have five of them to share — are critical for understanding how to restore and maintain long-lasting and just peace and security in Europe today, when they are again at risk.
1. Appeasing the aggressor leads to more aggression, not peace.
Concessions on unlawful territorial claims are a disastrous mistake. The partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938 only fueled Nazi Germany’s appetite and resulted in a global war. Learning from this lesson, Ukraine will never accept the legitimization of Russia’s occupation and annexation of any part of Ukraine’s territory. Respect for territorial integrity is a fundamental principle of international law. There will be no sustainable peace and security at the cost of Ukraine’s people, independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity.
2. Spheres of influence never bring peace and stability.
They bring oppression. World War II began when Nazi Germany invaded Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, one week after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and secret protocols to it between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich, agreeing to partition Poland, the Baltic States and the rest of Europe. Similarly, the victors sought to establish and consolidate their spheres of influence at a meeting in the Crimean city of Yalta in 1945. The cessation of fire in Europe on May 8, 1945, did not bring freedom to many European nations. They remained under Soviet occupation and control and suffered decades of international crimes, oppression and lack of freedom. For many of our states and our people, this nightmare ended only five decades later, with the re-establishment of our sovereignty and independence from 1989 to 1991.
Today Mr. Putin fantasizes about another Yalta, where he can draw borders on Europe’s map, once again undermining international law and the right of nations in Russia’s neighborhood to make their own choices and decisions. We must never allow this. Our principled position is that no third country has veto power over the choice of unions and alliances of Ukraine or any other nation. Ukraine has already made its choice — the choice of the European Union and NATO — and it is not for the Kremlin to scrutinize this.
3. A lack of accountability breeds future atrocities.
Nazi crimes were widely exposed, condemned, investigated and prosecuted, unlike Soviet ones. It’s very important that both totalitarian ideologies — Nazism and Soviet — receive proper evaluation in Europe. More light must be shed on crimes by the Soviet regime, including the deportations and executions of political prisoners in our countries, the destruction of Kyiv’s city center and the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station dam during the Soviet retreat in 1941, the mass-scale deportations of our people to Siberia, the violent repression of the members of anti-Soviet movements and the genocide of Crimean Tatars through deportation from their native land in 1944, to name a few. Hundreds of thousands of people were forcibly removed from their homes, many packed into cattle cars, and sent to remote regions of Siberia from the Baltics states alone. The crime of the Holodomor genocide, in particular, in which millions of Ukrainians starved to death, should have a more prominent place in the European historical understanding.
Soviet crimes must be properly condemned, including those committed during the Soviet occupation of Europe after World War II. Russia’s failure to properly condemn Stalinism and to compensate for the occupational damage and its overall feeling of impunity led to revanchism and aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. This case highlights the importance of accountability for Russia’s current crimes, including after the future fall of Mr. Putin’s regime.
4. Historical manipulation must be corrected.
As Russia continues its war against Ukraine and intensifies its hostile actions toward democratic European countries, the need to promote shared European remembrance narratives across the continent and beyond is more pressing than ever. A truthful assessment and profound understanding of history form the foundation of a society’s democratic resilience. We all stand ready to counter Russian disinformation activities and Russia’s attempts to rewrite European history.
Russia has no right to monopolize the victory over Nazism, which was accomplished by multiple nations and peoples. Even the Red Army was multinational, with at least six million Ukrainians fighting in its ranks. Instead of commemorating World War II victims, Mr. Putin’s regime has crafted an ugly cult of victory, utilizing the collective victory over the Nazis to justify its current aggression and atrocities against Ukrainians. The upcoming May 9 parade, in which Russia annually marks the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, is designed as the glorification of this cult. Mr. Putin will use it to rally more Russians to the front lines, solidify his regime and create an impression that his international isolation is fading. These plans must fail.
5. As President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said, ‘Freedom must be armed better than tyranny.’ In the current severe security deficit, sufficient defense capabilities are a must. Si vis pacem, para bellum. (If you want peace, prepare for war.) Ukraine will never accept any restrictions on its armed forces, defense capabilities or defense assistance. Instead, Kyiv is working to expand defense-industrial output and achieve defense self-sufficiency.
Learning these simple but important lessons of World War II is critical both to prevent the outbreak of World War III and to reinvent a fair international system with real security guarantees for peaceful democratic states that offers accountability for aggressors and deterrence of them. We must avoid repeating the mistakes that led to World War II and the subsequent Yalta system. We are confident that with sufficient resolve, we can do better, defend our principles and secure a free, united and secure Europe. We will continue working together to achieve this. Never again. This is the common warning of countries affected by the Treaty of Munich, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Yalta Agreement.
What was once unthinkable—direct conflict between the United States and
China—has now become a commonplace discussion in the national security
community. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is
not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous
solution to its “Taiwan problem.”
“There is a widening consensus about supplying Ukraine howitzers and more complex weapons systems, and everyone is now doing that,” Mr. Heisbourg noted.
“But it’s another thing to pivot the war aim from Ukraine to Russia. I don’t believe there’s any consensus on that.” Weakening Russia’s military capacity “is a good thing to do,” Mr. Heisbourg said, “but it’s a means to an end, not an end in itself.”
There are other factors that risk broadening the conflict. Within weeks, Sweden and Finland are expected to seek entry into NATO — expanding the alliance in reaction to Mr. Putin’s efforts to break it up. But the process could take months because each NATO country would have to ratify the move, and that could open a period of vulnerability. Russia could threaten both countries before they are formally accepted into the alliance and are covered by the NATO treaty that stipulates an attack on one member is an attack on all.
But there is less and less doubt that Sweden and Finland will become the 31st and 32nd members of the alliance. Mr. Niblett said a new expansion of NATO — just what Mr. Putin has been objecting to for the last two decades — would “make explicit the new front lines of the standoff with Russia.”
Not surprisingly, both sides are playing on the fear that the war could spread, in propaganda campaigns that parallel the ongoing war on the ground. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine frequently raises the possibility in his evening radio addresses; two weeks ago, imploring NATO allies for more arms, he argued that “we can either stop Russia or lose the whole of Eastern Europe.”
Russia has its own handbook, episodically arguing that its goals go beyond “denazification” of Ukraine to the removal of NATO forces and weapons from allied countries that did not host either before 1997. Moscow’s frequent references to the growing risk of nuclear war seem intended to drive home the point that the West should not push too far.
That message resonates in Germany, which has long sought to avoid provoking Mr. Putin, said Ulrich Speck, a German analyst. To say that “Russia must not win,” he said, is different from saying “Russia must lose.”
There is a concern in Berlin that “we shouldn’t push Putin too hard against the wall,” Mr. Speck said, “so that he may become desperate and do something truly irresponsible.”
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .
The term “dictator” comes from ancient Rome
— a man whom the republic would temporarily give absolute authority
during crises. The advantages of untrammeled power in a crisis are
obvious. A dictator can act quickly — no need to spend months
negotiating legislation or fighting legal challenges. And he can impose
necessary but unpopular policies. So there are times when autocratic
rule can look more effective than the messiness of democracies bound by
rule of law.
Dictatorship, however, starts to look a lot less attractive if it continues for any length of time.
The
most important argument against autocracy is, of course, moral: Very
few people can hold unrestrained power for years on end without turning
into brutal tyrants.
Beyond that,
however, in the long run autocracy is less effective than an open
society that allows dissent and debate. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago,
the advantages of having a strongman who can tell everyone what to do
are more than offset by the absence of free discussion and independent
thought.
I was writing at the time
about Vladimir Putin, whose decision to invade a neighboring country
looks more disastrous with each passing day. Evidently nobody dared to
tell him that Russia’s military might was overrated, that Ukrainians
were more patriotic and the West less decadent than he assumed and that
Russia remained highly vulnerable to economic sanctions.
But while we’re
all justifiably obsessed with the Ukraine war — I’m trying to limit my
reading of Ukraine news to 13 hours a day — it’s important to note that
there’s a superficially very different yet in a deep sense related
debacle unfolding in the world’s other big autocracy: China, which is
now experiencing a disastrous failure of its Covid policy.
Early evidence suggests that this war is turning in the West’s favor
for three reasons. The raw aggression of the Russian invasion and the
spirited Ukrainian resistance have inspired popular support for Ukraine
across Europe. Russia and Putin appear to have badly underestimated both
Ukraine’s determination and the global outrage against Moscow. Finally,
democratic governments on both sides of the Atlantic have made
far-reaching policy choices—economic, financial, diplomatic, and
security—that reflect a boldness of purpose and a newfound solidarity.
Yet the world remains in a dangerous and highly uncertain moment.
What happens after this conflict is as much a question mark as how,
when, and where the fighting ends. These four scenarios reflect
plausible outcomes—but they hardly exhaust all possibilities. Putin
could end up strengthened or weakened within Russia, depending on
domestic developments (a popular uprising or coup) and external ones
(China bolstering or reducing its support for Putin himself). He could
make a play for Moldova or Georgia, or even attempt to take the Suwalki
gap between Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus.
Wars, once begun, rarely follow a script. More frequently, they lead
combatants and non-combatants alike down unanticipated pathways, with
occasionally world-changing results. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
appears to have the seeds of such a conflict. What its outcome will mean
for Ukraine and the world remains to be seen.
Mr. Putin’s revisionist and absurd assertion that Ukraine was “entirely created by Russia” and effectively robbed from the Russian empire is fully in keeping with his warped worldview. Most disturbing to me: It was his attempt to establish the pretext for a full-scale invasion.
Should he invade, it will be a historic error.
In the 20-odd years since we met, Mr. Putin has charted his course by ditching democratic development for Stalin’s playbook. He has collected political and economic power for himself — co-opting or crushing potential competition — while pushing to re-establish a sphere of Russian dominance through parts of the former Soviet Union. Like other authoritarians, he equates his own well-being with that of the nation and opposition with treason. He is sure that Americans mirror both his cynicism and his lust for power and that in a world where everyone lies, he is under no obligation to tell the truth. Because he believes that the United States dominates its own region by force, he thinks Russia has the same right.
What's a cure for old age and death? For chaos? For pandora's bane?
When world peace is a sight unseen in a galaxy far, far away, when death and sickness come bearing down on our doorposts, what's the proper response?
The year 2017 will come to a close soon. Like in so many years before it, people will again hope for a better year, for a better world.
World peace will always be a cliche. Climate change may soon be a tired slogan on a fake campaign platform. Gender fairness is so 1990s as one writer admitted.
Twenty-first century appears to be mirroring its predecessor period. From a bipolar world that emerged from the Cold War, we are once again getting more fragmented and multi-polar. After the realignments of nations in the Second World War to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in the 1980s and the 1990s, spheres of influence have splintered.
Ball games are not safe with live ammunition and
civilian exposure.