№ 813. Waking Up to Quantum Dreams: China

 

 

Inside the China fitness club

How? Jörg Wuttke, a former longtime president of the E.U. Chamber of Commerce in China, calls it “the China fitness club,” and it works like this:

China starts with an emphasis on STEM education — science, technology, engineering and math. Each year, the country produces some 3.5 million STEM graduates, about equal the number of graduates from associate, bachelor’s, master’s and Ph.D. programs in all disciplines in the United States.

When you have that many STEM graduates, you can throw more talent at any problem than anyone else. As the Times Beijing bureau chief, Keith Bradsher, reported last year: “China has 39 universities with programs to train engineers and researchers for the rare earths industry. Universities in the United States and Europe have mostly offered only occasional courses.”

And while many Chinese engineers may not graduate with M.I.T.-level skills, the best are world class, and there are a lot of them. There are 1.4 billion people there. That means that in China, when you are a one-in-a-million talent, there are 1,400 other people just like you.

As important, Chinese vocational schools graduate tens of thousands of electricians, welders, carpenters, mechanics and plumbers every year, so when someone has an idea for a new product and wants to throw up a factory, it can get built really fast. You need a pink polka dot button that can sing the Chinese national anthem backward? Someone here will have it for you by tomorrow. It will also get delivered fast. Over 550 Chinese cities are connected by high-speed rail that makes our Amtrak Acela look like the Pony Express.

And when you relentlessly digitize and connect everything to everything, you can get in and out of your hotel room fast with just facial recognition. Tech-savvy beggars who carry printouts of QR codes can accept donations fast by the scan of a cellphone. The whole system is set up for speed — including if you challenge the rule of the Communist Party, in which case, you will be arrested fast, given the security cameras everywhere, and disappear fast.

If we don’t build a similar fitness club behind any tariff wall, we’ll get just inflation and stagnation. You cannot tariff your way to prosperity, especially at the dawn of A.I.

I was also in China four months ago. Between then and now, China’s A.I. innovators demonstrated their ability to grow their own open-source A.I. engine, DeepSeek, with far fewer specialized U.S. chips. I could feel the mojo in the tech community. It was palpable. Last month Premier Li Qiang said at the opening ceremony of the National People’s Congress that the Chinese government is supporting “the extensive application of large-scale A.I. models.”

A young Chinese auto engineer who once worked for Tesla here told me: “Now everyone is competing over how much A.I. is being inserted. Now you brag about how much A.I. you insert. Everyone is committed. ‘I will use A.I., even if I don’t know how right now.’ You are preparing for that, even if you are on a simple production line for manufacturing refrigerators. ‘I have to use A.I., because my boss told me to.’”

Attention, Kmart shoppers: When you already have a manufacturing engine as powerful and digitally connected as China’s and then you infuse it with A.I. at every level, it’s like injecting a stimulant that can optimize and accelerate every aspect of manufacturing, from design to testing to production.

Not a good time for U.S. lawmakers to be shunning visits to China for fear of being called panda huggers.

As Han Shen Lin, an American who works as the China country director for the Asia Group, put it to me over breakfast at Shanghai’s Peace Hotel, “DeepSeek should not have been a surprise.” But, he continued, with all the new U.S. “overseas investment restrictions and disincentives to collaborate, we are now blind to China tech developments. China is defining the tech standards of the future without U.S. input. This will put us at a serious competitive disadvantage in the future.”

 

 

№ 810. The Adolescence of Technology: Confronting and Overcoming the Risks of Powerful AI

Calvin & Hobbes

 

 

By Dario Amodei

 

January 2026

There is a scene in the movie version of Carl Sagan’s book Contact where the main character, an astronomer who has detected the first radio signal from an alien civilization, is being considered for the role of humanity’s representative to meet the aliens. The international panel interviewing her asks, “If you could ask [the aliens] just one question, what would it be?” Her reply is: “I’d ask them, ‘How did you do it? How did you evolve, how did you survive this technological adolescence without destroying yourself?” When I think about where humanity is now with AI—about what we’re on the cusp of—my mind keeps going back to that scene, because the question is so apt for our current situation, and I wish we had the aliens’ answer to guide us. I believe we are entering a rite of passage, both turbulent and inevitable, which will test who we are as a species. Humanity is about to be handed almost unimaginable power, and it is deeply unclear whether our social, political, and technological systems possess the maturity to wield it.

In my essay Machines of Loving Grace, I tried to lay out the dream of a civilization that had made it through to adulthood, where the risks had been addressed and powerful AI was applied with skill and compassion to raise the quality of life for everyone. I suggested that AI could contribute to enormous advances in biology, neuroscience, economic development, global peace, and work and meaning. I felt it was important to give people something inspiring to fight for, a task at which both AI accelerationists and AI safety advocates seemed—oddly—to have failed. But in this current essay, I want to confront the rite of passage itself: to map out the risks that we are about to face and try to begin making a battle plan to defeat them. I believe deeply in our ability to prevail, in humanity’s spirit and its nobility, but we must face the situation squarely and without illusions.

As with talking about the benefits, I think it is important to discuss risks in a careful and well-considered manner. In particular, I think it is critical to:

• Avoid doomerism. Here, I mean “doomerism” not just in the sense of believing doom is inevitable (which is both a false and self-fulfilling belief), but more generally, thinking about AI risks in a quasi-religious way.¹ Many people have been thinking in an analytic and sober way about AI risks for many years, but it’s my impression that during the peak of worries about AI risk in 2023–2024, some of the least sensible voices rose to the top, often through sensationalistic social media accounts. These voices used off-putting language reminiscent of religion or science fiction, and called for extreme actions without having the evidence that would justify them. It was clear even then that a backlash was inevitable, and that the issue would become culturally polarized and therefore gridlocked.² As of 2025–2026, the pendulum has swung, and AI opportunity, not AI risk, is driving many political decisions. This vacillation is unfortunate, as the technology itself doesn’t care about what is fashionable, and we are considerably closer to real danger in 2026 than we were in 2023. The lesson is that we need to discuss and address risks in a realistic, pragmatic manner: sober, fact-based, and well equipped to survive changing tides. 

• Acknowledge uncertainty. There are plenty of ways in which the concerns I’m raising in this piece could be moot. Nothing here is intended to communicate certainty or even likelihood. Most obviously, AI may simply not advance anywhere near as fast as I imagine.³ Or, even if it does advance quickly, some or all of the risks discussed here may not materialize (which would be great), or there may be other risks I haven’t considered. No one can predict the future with complete confidence—but we have to do the best we can to plan anyway.

• Intervene as surgically as possible. Addressing the risks of AI will require a mix of voluntary actions taken by companies (and private third-party actors) and actions taken by governments that bind everyone. The voluntary actions—both taking them and encouraging other companies to follow suit—are a no-brainer for me. I firmly believe that government actions will also be required to some extent, but these interventions are different in character because they can potentially destroy economic value or coerce unwilling actors who are skeptical of these risks (and there is some chance they are right!). It’s also common for regulations to backfire or worsen the problem they are intended to solve (and this is even more true for rapidly changing technologies). It’s thus very important for regulations to be judicious: they should seek to avoid collateral damage, be as simple as possible, and impose the least burden necessary to get the job done.⁴ It is easy to say, “No action is too extreme when the fate of humanity is at stake!,” but in practice this attitude simply leads to backlash. To be clear, I think there’s a decent chance we eventually reach a point where much more significant action is warranted, but that will depend on stronger evidence of imminent, concrete danger than we have today, as well as enough specificity about the danger to formulate rules that have a chance of addressing it. The most constructive thing we can do today is advocate for limited rules while we learn whether or not there is evidence to support stronger ones.⁵

№ 668. War Games: The Lethal Dance of Three Lovers

What was once unthinkable—direct conflict between the United States and China—has now become a commonplace discussion in the national security community. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem.”